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Abstract
Bohr and Heisenberg suggested that the thermodynamical quantities of
temperature and energy are complementary in the same way as position and
momentum in quantum mechanics. Roughly speaking, their idea was that a
definite temperature can be attributed to a system only if it is submerged in
a heat bath, in which case energy fluctuations are unavoidable. On the other
hand, a definite energy can only be assigned to systems in thermal isolation,
thus excluding the simultaneous determination of its temperature.
Rosenfeld extended this analogy with quantum mechanics and obtained
a quantitative uncertainty relation in the form ∆U∆(1/T ) ≥ k where k is
Boltzmann’s constant. The two ‘extreme’ cases of this relation would then
characterize this complementarity between isolation (U definite) and contact
with a heat bath (T definite). Other formulations of the thermodynamical
uncertainty relations were proposed by Mandelbrot (1956, 1989), Lindhard
(1986) and Lavenda (1987, 1991). This work, however, has not led to a con-
sensus in the literature.
It is shown here that the uncertainty relation for temperature and energy in
the version of Mandelbrot is indeed exactly analogous to modern formulations
of the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations. However, his relation holds
only for the canonical distribution, describing a system in contact with a heat
bath. There is, therefore, no complementarity between this situation and a
thermally isolated system.
1 Introduction
The uncertainty relations and the principle of complementarity are usually seen
as hallmarks of quantum mechanics. However, in some writings of Bohr and
Heisenberg1 one can find the idea that there also is a complementary relationship
in classical physics, in particular between the concepts of energy and temperature.
Roughly speaking, their argument is that the only way to attribute a definite tem-
perature to a physical system is by bringing it into thermal contact and equilibrium
with another very large system acting as a heat bath. In this case, however, the
system will freely exchange energy with the heat bath, and one is cut off from the
possibility of controlling its energy. On the other hand, in order to make sure a
system has a definite energy, one should isolate it from its environment. But then
there is no way to determine its temperature.
This idea is in remarkable analogy to Bohr’s famous analysis of complementar-
ity in quantum mechanics, which is likewise based on a similar mutual exclusion of
experimental arrangements serving to determine the position and momentum of a
system. And just as this complementary relationship in quantum mechanics finds
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its ‘symbolic expression’, as Bohr puts it, in the uncertainty relation ∆p∆q >∼ h¯,
one might expect to obtain an analogous uncertainty relation for energy and tem-
perature, or, perhaps, some functions of these quantities. Dimensional analysis
already leads to the conjecture that this relation would take the form
∆U∆
1
T
>∼ k (1)
where k denotes the Boltzmann constant.
However these ideas have not received much recognizition in the literature. An
obvious objection is that the mathematical structure of quantum theory is radically
different from that of clasical physical theories. There are no non-commuting ob-
servables in thermodynamics. Therefore, a derivation of the uncertainty relation
(1) analogous to that of the usual Heisenberg relations is impossible. For example,
the biography of Bohr by Pais2 dismisses his proposal of a complementary principle
in thermodynamics on the grounds that there does not exist a general uncertainty
relation like (1) to back it up.
Nevertheless, several authors3−12 have in fact produced derivations of a relation
of this kind, and defended the idea that it reveals a complementarity between ther-
mal isolation and embedding in a heat bath. An even more far-reaching claim is put
forward by Rosenfeld6, Mandelbrot3−5 and Lavenda7−10. These authors argue that
the uncertainty relation (1) actually blocks any reduction of thermodynamics to a
microscopic theory picturing an underlying molecular reality, in the same way as
Heisenberg’s relation would forbid a ‘hidden variables’ reconstruction of quantum
mechanics.
However, these claims, and indeed the very validity of (1), have been disputed
by other physicists. An example of this controversy is provided by the polemic
exchange between Feshbach, Kittel and Mandelbrot in the years 1987-9 in Physics
Today.13−15 One of the immediately arising questions is what the exact meaning
of the ∆’s in (1) could be. A first thought may be that these uncertainties are
to be understood as standard deviations of a random quantity, according to one
of the probability distributions (or ensembles) of statistical mechanics. But in the
commonly used ensembles to describe a system in contact with a heat bath, the
canonical ones, temperature is just a fixed parameter and doesn’t fluctuate at all.
On the other hand, in the microcanonical ensemble the energy is fixed! So this
straightforward interpretation cannot be correct.
Indeed, all versions of uncertainty relation (1) which have been proposed in the
literature employ different theoretical frameworks and give different interpretations
of the uncertainty ∆β, in most cases by using concepts from theories of statistical
inference. Our purpose is to review and criticize the existing derivations and the
associated claims (Sections 2 and 3). We shall argue that even though there exist
valid versions of this relation, it does not express complementarity between energetic
isolation and thermal contact.
We also propose (Section 4) an elaboration of the approach of Mandelbrot,
which is based on the Crame´r-Rao inequality from the theory of statistical esti-
mation. We generalize this approach by means of the concept of distance between
probability distributions. This statistical distance is a measure of distinguishabil-
ity: the smaller the distance between two probability distributions, the worse they
can be distinguished by any method of mathematical statistics. It will be shown
that this statistical distance leads to an improvement of the Crame´r-Rao inequal-
ity. The resulting uncertainty relation has the virtue of being completely analogous
to a quantum mechanical formulation. In section 5 we will use this approach to
investigate intermediate cases between the canonical and microcanonical ensemble.
2
2 The approach from fluctuation theory: Rosen-
feld and Schlo¨gl
The best-known proposal for a quantitative uncertainty relation between energy
and temperature is that of Rosenfeld6. He obtained the result
∆U∆T = kT 20 (2)
for the standard deviations (root mean square fluctuations) of energy and temper-
ature of a small but macroscopic system in thermal contact with a heat bath kept
at the fixed temperature T0. In the case of small fluctuations, ∆T ≪ T0, ∆β ≈ ∆TkT 2
0
and Rosenfeld’s result reduces to (1).
Rosenfeld’s interpretation of relation (2) fits seamlessly into the Copenhagen
tradition. He argues that the meaning of physical quantities has to be obtained
by operational definitions, i.e. by referring to our experimental abilities to control
their values. Thus the meaningfulness of quantities depends on the experimental
context, just like in quantum mechanics. Energetic isolation and thermal contact
with a heat reservoir are contexts that exclude each other and therefore U and T
are not simultaneously meaningful. The uncertainty relation (2) symbolizes this
fact. More generally, Rosenfeld speaks of a complementarity between dynamical
and thermodynamical modes of description.
This complementarity, according to Rosenfeld, is equally fundamental as Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty relation. He argues that reference to the underlying microscopic
constitution of the system will not succeed in restoring a unified description, just
because the dynamical and thermodynamical concepts are only meaningful in mu-
tually exclusive experimental conditions.
For the actual derivation of (2) Rosenfeld refers to the textbook of Landau
and Lifshitz14. This book offers a treatment of thermal fluctuations for a small
macroscopic system in an environment at fixed temperature T0 and pressure p0. It
is based on Einstein’s postulate, which inverts and reinterprets Boltzmann’s famous
formula S = k lnW into:
W (X) ∝ eStot(X)/k (3)
in order to assign relative probabilities to thermodynamical states X in terms of
their entropy S. Here, X denotes a state of the total system (small system and
environment) and Stot is the total entropy. An equivalent formulation is
W (X) =W (X0)e
(Stot(X)−Stot(X0))/k (4)
where X0 is the equilibrium state.
The probabilities W (X) are interpreted as the relative frequencies with which
the states X occur during a very long time interval, i.e. they describe fluctuations.
An essential assumption is now that both the small system and the environment
taken separately are always in thermodynamical equilibrium states. Thus, even
though they need not be in thermal or mechanical equilibrium with each other, it
is assumed that they can always be characterized by equilibrium states on which
the ordinary thermodynamical formalism is applicable. The entropy fluctuation
Stot(X)−Stot(X0) of the total system can then be calculated in terms of the minimal
amount of work needed to restore the equilibrium state X0. This can be expressed
in the state variables of the small system and the fixed equilibrium values p0 and
T0:
Stot(X)− Stot(X0) = −U(x) + p0V
T0
+ S(x) (5)
where the variable x denotes the state of the small system. Thus, from (4) and (5)
one can determine the fluctuation probabilities in terms of the state variables of
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the small system. Choosing a complete set of independent state variables, say x =
(V, T ), and expanding (4) up to second order around its maximum value, one can
approximate this distribution by a Gaussian probability distribution over V and T .
Landau and Lifshitz determine the standard deviations of several thermodynamic
quantities considered as functions of V and T . In particular they obtain (pp. 352,
356)
(∆T )2 =
kT 20
CV
(6)
and
(∆U)2 = −
(
T0
(
∂P
∂T
)
V
− p0
)2
kT0
(
∂V
∂P
)
T
+ CV kT
2
0 . (7)
Here, CV =
(
∂U
∂T
)
V
is the specific heat of the system and the quantities in the
right-hand sides of (6,7) are all to be evaluated at the equilibrium values. Finally,
in order to arrive at (2), Rosenfeld simply assumed that the volume of the system
is constant (so that ∂V∂P = 0).
Let us now see if this result bears out Rosenfeld’s interpretation. There are
several objections. A first group of objections is directed in particular against his
claim that the result would be ‘equally fundamental’ as the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation. First, the relation (2) is obtained by ignoring the first term in the right-
hand side of (7). This is obviously not a satisfactory general procedure, unless one
can prove that the deleted term is always non-negative. For usual thermodynamical
systems, one has indeed15
T0 > 0,
(
∂V
∂P
)
T
< 0 (8)
so that a more general inequality ∆U∆T ≥ kT 20 results from (6) and (7). However,
the inequalities (8) are in turn derived by an appeal to the stability of thermody-
namical states. The assumption that all equilibrium states occurring in nature are
stable is obviously not a fundamental law.
Secondly, the above derivation relies on a Gaussian approximation to (4). This,
likewise, cannot claim fundamental validity. Moreover, the question how well the
Gaussian distribution approximates the true distribution (4) depends on the choice
of the variables to parameterize the macroscopic states. (That is, whether one
uses the pairs (V, T ), (P, V ) etc., or prefers T above β, or perhaps (T − T0)3 as a
temperature scale.) The choice of state variables is usually regarded as a matter of
convention, and one would not like a fundamental result to depend on this.
A third objection is that whatever limitations (2) poses on the simultaneous
meaningfulness of the concepts of energy and temperature, a look at the right-
hand side of this relation immediately suggests that these limitations will become
negligible if we take the temperature of the heat bath sufficiently low. This again is
in obvious contrast to Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation which provides an absolute
lower bound for all quantum states.
Remarkably, it is possible to overcome all the above objections and obtain a
more generally valid uncertainty relation for the situation considered here. To see
this, let us choose (U, V ) as the set of independent state variables and write the
probability distribution resulting from the Einstein postulate in the form
p(U, V ) = Ce−β0(U+p0V )+S(U,V )/k (9)
and introduce the quantity
β(U, V ) :=
∂ ln p(U, V )
∂U
+ β0 (10)
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It is easy to see that β(U, V ) =
(
∂S
∂U
)
V
, and is thus identical to the usual thermo-
dynamical definition of the inverse temperature of the system. Using the general
inequality
∆A∆B ≥ |Cov(A,B)| := 〈(A− 〈A〉)(B − 〈B〉)〉 (11)
where 〈·〉 denotes the expectation value with respect to (9) and noting that Cov(U, β) =
−1 (by partial integration and assuming that p(U, V ) = 0 when U = 0), one obtains
∆U∆β ≥ 1 (12)
independent of stability arguments, Gaussian approximation or the value of T0.
This relation was first obtained by Schlo¨gl12.
Let us make a few comments on this improved result. Note that there is no
assumption of an underlying mechanical phase space of the system. Rather, one
works directly with probability distributions over the macroscopically observable
variables. Thus, the derivation is not a part of the Gibbsian theory of statisti-
cal mechanics. Rather, the above treatment, combining orthodox thermodynamics
with a probability postulate is typical for statistical thermodynamics. In principle,
it is an open question whether this version of statistical thermodynamics is con-
sistent with the existence of an underlying microscopic phase space on which all
thermodynamical quantities can be defined as functions.
Indeed a remarkable aspect of this version of statistical thermodynamics is that
quantities like temperature and entropy depend on the probability distribution, via
the Einstein postulate. This means one cannot vary the probability distribution
and the temperature independently. Obviously, this aspect alone already provides
an obstacle to a hidden-variables-style reconstruction.
The same aspect, however, makes the relation (12) rather different from quan-
tum mechanical uncertainty relations. It states only that there are non-vanishing
fluctuations in energy and inverse temperature for the distribution (9). For an
arbitrary distribution, the quantity β defined by (10) does not coincide with the
inverse temperature. This limited validity does not license a complementarity in-
terpretation. For example, for the ideal gas one has β(U, V ) = CVkU , with CV a
constant, i.e. β is a bijective function of U . Clearly, as Lindhard11 pointed out, any
claim that ‘precise knowledge of U precludes precise knowledge of β’ would be quite
untenable here. The positive lower bound for ∆U∆β is due, in this case, to their
correlation rather than their complementarity. One is not left, for a given system,
with a choice of making ∆U smaller at the expense of ∆β or vice versa. Indeed, the
relative values of the two uncertainties in (9) are decided by the size of the system
(which determines the heat capacity CV ), not by context of observation.
Thus, important objections against Rosenfeld’s interpretation of the uncertainty
relation (2) remain, even in the improved version (12). Note also that while Rosen-
feld speaks of a complementarity between thermal contact and energetic isolation,
the above treatment nowhere refers to isolated systems. The only experimental
context considered in the derivation is that of thermal contact with a heat bath.
Therefore, the basis for Rosenfeld’s assertions is very weak.
Perhaps Rosenfeld’s interpretation was inspired by a short remark at the end of
Landau and Lifshitz’s discussion16, where they mention that temperature fluctua-
tions can also be considered “from another point of view”, and briefly discuss the
canonical and microcanonical ensembles. They state that one must assume temper-
ature fluctuations exist also in an isolated system, so that the result (6) “represents
the accuracy with which the temperature of an isolated body can be specified.”
However, none of this follows from the treatment they actually present.
Now one could try to provide such an analysis of thermal fluctuations in an
energetically isolated system along the lines of Landau and Lifshitz. However, this
will obviously lead to ∆U = 0, and in the example of the ideal gas, ∆β = 0 as
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well. The only way in which temperature fluctuations can be obtained is therefore
either by specializing to systems where β is not a function of U alone (e.g. a photon
gas where β(U, V ) ∝ (V/U)1/4), or by generalizing the approach to allow for local
fluctuations within different parts of the system. However, we shall not pursue this.
3 Statistical inference
The approaches to the derivation of thermodynamic uncertainty relations we discuss
next are all related to the field of statistical inference. We therefore start this section
with a short introduction to this subject. The theory of statistical inference has been
developed in the twenties and thirties by mathematical statisticians, working largely
outside the physics community. The physicists working in statistical physics have
for a long time continued thinking about statistics using the concepts laid down in
the older work of Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs. Still, it has been recognized since
the sixties that statistical physics can benefit from the ideas and concepts developed
in mathematical statistics. For our purpose the most significant aspect is that more
sophisticated concepts of uncertainty are available here than the standard deviation.
However, the field of statistical inference is one in which several approaches exist
and there is a longstanding debate about its foundations. If statistical physics can
profit from the developments in statistical inference, it also cannot remain immune
to this debate, as we shall see. We shall meet four approaches to statistical inference:
estimation theory, Bayesianism, fiducial probability and likelihood inference. We
shall see that the so-called Fisher information plays a prominent (but different) role
in most of them.
3.1 Estimation theory
Generally speaking, statistical inference can be described as the problem of decid-
ing how well a set of outcomes, obtained in independent measurements, fits to a
proposed probability distribution. If the probability distribution is characterized by
one or more parameters, this problem is equivalent to inferring the value of the pa-
rameter(s) from the observed measurement outcomes x. Perhaps the simplest, and
most well-known approach to the problem is the theory of estimation, developed by
R.A. Fisher.
In this approach it is assumed that one out of a family {pθ(x)} of distribution
functions is the ‘true’ one; the parameter θ being unknown. To make inferences
about the parameter, one constructs estimators, i.e. functions θˆ(x1, . . . , xn) of the
outcomes of n independent repeated measurements. The value of this function is
intended to represent the best guess for θ. Several criteria are imposed on these
estimators in order to ensure that their values do in fact constitute ‘good’ estimates
of the parameter θ. Unbiasedness for instance, i.e.
〈θˆ〉θ =
∫
θˆ(x1, . . . , xn)
n∏
i=1
pθ(xi)dxi = θ (for all θ) (13)
demands that the expectation of θˆ, calculated using a given value of θ, reproduces
that value. If also the standard deviation ∆θ θˆ of the estimator is as small as possible,
the estimator is called efficient.
The so-called Crame´r-Rao inequality puts a bound to the efficiency of an arbi-
trary estimator:
(∆θ θˆ)
2 ≥
(
|d〈θˆ〉θdθ |
)2
nIF (θ)
(14)
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where
IF (θ) =
∫
1
pθ(x)
(
dpθ(x)
dθ
)2
dx (15)
is a quantity depending only on the family {pθ(x)}, known as the Fisher informa-
tion.
The Crame´r-Rao inequality (14) is valid for any estimator for a given family of
probability distributions obeying certain regularity conditions17. Specific choices
of estimators are the maximum likelihood estimators. These are functions θˆML
which maximize the likelihood L(x1,...,xn)(θ) =
∏n
i=1 pθ(xi). They are asymptot-
ically efficient, i.e. they approach the bound of the Crame´r-Rao inequality in the
limit n→∞.
Another important criterion in estimation theory is that of sufficiency. Suppose
that for a given estimator θˆ(x1, . . . , xn) the probability distribution function can be
written as
pθ(x1, . . . , xn) = p˜θ(θˆ)f(x1, . . . , xn) (16)
where p˜θ(θˆ) is the marginal distribution of θˆ and f is an arbitrary function which
does not depend on θ. Thus, given the value of θˆ(x1, . . . , xn), the values of the
data x1, . . . , xn are distributed independently of θ. In that case, θˆ(x1, . . . , xn) is
said to be a sufficient estimator, because it contains all the information about the
parameter that can be obtained from the data.
Sufficiency is a natural and appealing demand for estimation problems. Un-
fortunately sufficient estimators do not always exist. A theorem by Pitman and
Koopman states that sufficient estimators exist only for the so-called exponential
family, i.e. distributions of the form
pθ(x) = exp (A(x) +B(x)C(θ) +D(θ)) (17)
where A, . . . ,D are arbitrary functions (apart, of course, from the normalization
constraint). Fortunately, most of the one-parameter distributions that we meet in
statistical physics do belong to the exponential family.
Note that the Fisher information for θ in n observations remains unaffected
when we restrict the set of data to a sufficient estimator:
IF (θ) =
∫
1
pθ(x1, . . . , xn)
(
dpθ(x1, . . . , xn)
dθ
)2
dx1 · · ·dxn =
∫
1
p˜θ(θˆ)
(
dp˜θ(θˆ)
dθ
)2
dθˆ
(18)
where p˜θ(θˆ) is the marginal probability distribution of θˆ. By contrast, IF decreases
when the data are restricted to a non-sufficient estimator. In this sense too, a
sufficient estimator extracts the maximum amount of information about θ from the
data.
3.2 Uncertainty relations from estimation theory: Mandel-
brot
Mandelbrot3 was probably the first to link statistical physics with the theory of
statistical inference. He obtained a thermodynamic uncertainty relation using the
methods of estimation theory.
Like Rosenfeld and Landau and Lifshitz, he adopts the point of view of statisti-
cal thermodynamics in which the concept of an underlying microscopic phase space
is superfluous and one works directly with probability distributions over macro-
scopic variables of the system. In contrast to the previous discussion, where such
a distribution is obtained from the Einstein postulate, one now starts by assuming
the existence of a probability distribution pβ(U) to describe the energy fluctuations
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of a system in contact with a heat bath at temperature β. The temperature of
the system is thus represented by a parameter in its probabilistic description. By
imposing a number of axioms Mandelbrot4 is able to determine the form of this
probability distribution. The most important of these is the demand that sufficient
estimators for β should be functions of the energy U alone. This enables him to
invoke the Pitman-Koopman theorem (17) which eventually leads to the form:
pβ(U) =
e−βUω(U)
Z(β)
, (19)
with Z(β) the partition function, i.e. the normalization constant and ω(U) the
so-called structure function of the system.18
Mandelbrot considered the question of estimating the unknown parameter β of
this system by measurements of the energy. The Fisher information in this case
equals
IF (β) = (∆βU)
2 = 〈U2〉β − 〈U〉2β . (20)
Thus, if we apply the Crame´r-Rao inequality for unbiased estimators βˆ, we imme-
diately find the result:
∆βU∆β βˆ ≥ 1. (21)
This is Mandelbrot’s uncertainty relation between energy and temperature. It ex-
presses that the efficiency with which temperature can be estimated is bounded
by the spread in energy. Note that this does not mean that the temperature fluc-
tuates: it is assumed throughout that the system is adequately described by the
canonical distribution function (19) with fixed β. Rather, the estimators fluctuate
(i.e. they are random quantities). Their standard deviation is employed, as usual
in estimation theory, as a criterion to indicate the quality (efficiency) with which β
is estimated. Thus the two ∆’s in the relation (21) have different interpretations,
in contrast to the result of Rosenfeld or Schlo¨gl.
Let us make some remarks on this result. On first sight, the use of such differ-
ent interpretations for the two uncertainties in relation (21) may seem to reveal a
striking disanalogy with the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations. However,
recent work on the quantum mechanical relations has shown that here too it is
advantageous to employ concepts from the theory of statistical inference. Already
several authors19−21 have advocated the Crame´r-Rao inequality for a formulation
of the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations which improves upon Heisenberg’s
inequality. We shall discuss these developments in section 4. Let it suffice to remark
here that the approach by Mandelbrot is actually in close analogy with these recent
formulations in quantum mechanics.
Mandelbrot3 calls the spirit of his approach “extremely close to that of the
conventional (Copenhagen) approach to quantum theory” and argues that the in-
compatibility of quantum theory and hidden variables is comparable to that of
statistical thermodynamics and kinetic theory. In later works4,5,13 however, he
no longer claims that statistical thermodynamics is incompatible with, but only
indifferent to, the use of kinetical or microscopic models. Thus he writes: “Our
approach. . . realizes a dream of the 19th century ‘energeticists’: to describe matter-
in-bulk without reference to atoms. It is a pity that all energeticists have passed
away long ago.”22. Indeed, his aproach can be readily extended to statistical me-
chanics by assuming the existence of a mechanical phase space and interpreting the
distribution (19) as a marginal of a canonical distribution over phase space:
pβ(U) =
1
Z(β)
∫
H(~p1,...,~pN ;~q1,...,~qN )=U
e−βH(~p1,...,~pN ;~q1,...,~qN ) d~p1 · · · d~pN d~q1 · · · d~qN
(22)
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where (~p1, . . . , ~pN ; ~q1, . . . , ~qN ) ∈ IR6N is the microscopic state of the system and
H denotes its Hamiltonian. The structure function is then identified with the area
measure of the energy hyper-surfaceH(~p1, . . . , ~pN ; ~q1, . . . , ~qN ) = U . Of course, since
the evolution of the microscopic state is now dictated by the mechanical equations
of motion, the validity of the interpretation of the probabilities as time frequencies
needs additional attention, e.g. by the assumption of an ergodic-like hypothesis.
Note, however, that such a detailed microscopic description does not help for
the estimation of β. The energy is still a sufficient estimator, and therefore contains
all relevant information about the temperature. No further information is gained
by specifying other phase functions as well, or indeed the exact microscopic state
itself. Thus, we can restrict our attention to the distribution over the energy.
Further, we note that, since Mandelbrot relies on the Crame´r-Rao inequality,
his uncertainty relation is valid only when the canonical distributions are regular
(cf. footnote 17). Thus, it may fail, for example, for systems capable of undergoing
phase transitions.
Mandelbrot’s result (21) applies, like those discussed in section 2, only to systems
imbedded in a heat bath. Let us now ask whether it can be extended to isolated
systems in order to see whether there is some kind of complementarity between
these two contexts. The distribution function is in this case microcanonical
pǫ(U) = δ(U − ǫ), (23)
where ǫ is the fixed energy of the system.
The first problem one can then raise, in analogy with the previous case, is that
of inferring the value of the energy parameter ǫ. It is immediately clear however
that a single measurement of the energy U itself suffices to estimate ǫ with utmost
accuracy. The Fisher information is infinite, and no informative uncertainty relation
arises in this case. That is, choosing ǫˆ = U as estimator for ǫ, we obtain:
∆ǫǫˆ = 0. (24)
A next and more interesting problem is then what can be said about the temper-
ature in the microcanonical distribution. This, of course, presupposes that one can
give a definition of temperature of an isolated system. Mandelbrot13 proposes to
address this problem by regarding the isolated system as if it had been prepared in
contact with a heat bath, i.e. as if it were drawn from a canonical ensemble. In that
case the discussion of our previous problem (i.e. of estimating the temperature of
the heat bath) would have been applicable. His proposal is to treat the assignment
of a temperature to the isolated system in the same way as the estimation of the
unknown parameter β of this hypothetical canonical distribution. In other words,
whatever function βˆ(U) is a ‘good’ estimator of β in the canonical case is also a
good definition of temperature in the microcanonical case.
It is interesting, therefore, to consider some specific estimators for β. Mandelbrot
mentions three of them. The maximum likelihood estimator βˆ1(U) is defined as the
solution of the equation (
dpβ(U)
dβ
)
β=βˆ1
= 0. (25)
Other choices are:
βˆ2(U) =
d lnΩ(U)
dU
, (26)
and
βˆ3(U) =
d lnω(U)
dU
(27)
where
Ω(U) ≡
∫ U
0
ω(U ′)dU ′. (28)
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These functions are in fact often proposed as candidate definitions of the tempera-
ture of isolated systems.23 They generally yield different values for finite systems,
but for typical systems in statistical mechanics (consisting of particles with finite
range interactions), they converge for large numbers of particles.24 For the ideal gas,
for example, one has βˆ1(U) = βˆ2(U) = 3N/(2U) and βˆ3(U) = (3N−2)/(2U). How-
ever, in other cases, e.g. for a system consisting of magnetic moments, where ω(U)
is decreasing in a part of its domain, βˆ2 and βˆ3 may take opposite signs, even in
the thermodynamical limit. The problem of choosing a general ‘best’ temperature
function still seems to be undecided.
Even so, following Mandelbrot’s proposal, one can associate a proper tempera-
ture to an isolated system. One might now expect, perhaps from the suggestions of
Landau and Lifshitz, or from a supposed symmetry in a complementarity relation-
ship, that there should be unavoidable fluctuations of such a temperature function
in an isolated system. However, all the candidate functions βˆi above are functions
of U , and thus remain constant in the microcanonical ensemble. Hence one obtains
〈βˆi〉ǫ = βˆi(ǫ) and
∆ǫU = 0, ∆ǫβˆi = 0. (29)
Thus, again, no uncertainty relation is obtained for the microcanonical ensemble.
This result will clearly hold generally for all candidate temperature functions in
Mandelbrot’s proposal, since the postulate that U should sufficient for β implies
that ‘good’ (i.e. efficient) estimators depend on U alone.
This is not the conclusion Mandelbrot draws, however. He proposes13 to judge
not only the temperature, but also the uncertainty in temperature from the point
of view of the canonical ensemble from which the isolated system could have been a
member. Also the uncertainty in energy is calculated from this counterfactual point
of view. Thus we simply recover the canonical uncertainty relation (21) which is
now, counterfactually, said to apply also to the microcanonical case. But this does
not seem to be a satisfactory procedure to generalize the validity of a relation.
We conclude that although Mandelbrot’s approach encompasses a discussion of
both isolated systems as well as systems in a heat bath, the result is still that there
is no complementarity between canonical and microcanonical ensembles (isolation
and thermal contact with a heat bath).
3.3 The Bayesian approach: Lavenda
Another major school of thought in statistical inference is Bayesianism. According
to Bayesian statistics, probabilities can be attributed to all kinds of statements,
in particular also to other probability statements. Thus, one is allowed to assume
that so-called prior probabilities ρ(β) can be attributed to the parameter β in the
canonical distribution. Furthermore, the canonical distribution is interpreted as a
conditional probability pβ(U) = p(U |β). One is then able, by means of Bayes’s
theorem,
p(β|U) = p(U |β)ρ(β)Z(U) (30)
with Z(U) =
∫
p(U |β)ρ(β)dβ (31)
to obtain a so-called posterior probability distribution over β conditioned on a given
value of U . The tenet of the Bayesian approach is that all inferential judgements
about β on the basis of an observed value of U are encapsulated in this posterior
distribution. In particular, the uncertainty about its value can be quantified by the
standard deviation of the posterior distribution.
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The major problem in Bayesian statistics is the choice of the prior distribution
ρ. Usually this choice is made with the help of an argument appealing to our prior
ignorance of the value of β. Therefore, Bayesian statistics is often regarded as in-
timately connected to a ‘degrees of belief’ interpretation of probability, in contrast
to the relative frequency interpretation adopted above. The simplest choice for a
prior distribution representing ignorance would, of course, be a uniform distribu-
tion. However, Jeffreys25 has argued that in the case of a non-negative physical
quantity β, appearing as a parameter in a probability distribution, the appropriate
representation of ignorance is by putting
ρ(β) =
√
IF (β) (32)
where IF (β) is the Fisher information (15). The main motivation for this choice is
that this makes the distribution invariant under bijective reparameterization, which
is obviously desirable for a distribution intended to represent a state of ignorance.
A drawback is that the prior distribution (32) is often not normalizable. However,
the posterior distribution usually is.
Let us now consider the question whether a thermodynamic uncertainty relation
can be obtained in this approach. That is, we ask whether there is a relation between
the standard deviation in ∆Uβ of (30) and the standard deviation ∆βU of (19).
Unfortunately, in general nothing definite about this question can be said. Indeed,
it is obvious that both standard deviations contain a parameter, U (the observed
value of the total energy) and β respectively, which are functionally independent.
As we will see, however, it is possible to derive uncertainty relations for specific
choices of these parameters.
Note that since this approach yields a probability distribution over β, its un-
certainty can be quantified by means of a proper standard deviation of β. This is
possible because the Bayesian approach obliterates, as a matter of principle, the dis-
tinction between parameters and random quantities. However, this does not mean
that β fluctuates; rather, the posterior distribution from which ∆β is calculated has
a meaning in terms of degrees of belief, so that ∆β represents a region of epistemic
uncertainty.
Using this Bayesian approach, Lavenda7−10 claims to have arrived at an uncer-
tainty relation:
∆U∆β ≥ 1, (33)
where the equality sign applies to equilibrium distributions, and a strict inequality
holds for irreversible processes. He argues that this result “stands in defense of a
purely statistical interpretation of thermodynamics”26, just as the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle protects quantum mechanics from a hidden variables interpretation.
This suggests that the uncertainty relation would forbid a mechanical underpinning
of statistical thermodynamics. However, he apparently does not wish to go so far,
because he also writes that the statistical inference approach to thermodynamics is
analogous to the orthodox approach to quantum theory in the sense that it “circum-
vents a more fundamental, molecular description.” This suggests that a molecular
description is merely unnecessary, rather than impossible; a position which would
come close to that of Mandelbrot in his later writings. However, Lavenda seems to
have changed his views in the opposite direction, since later27 he does argue that
the thermodynamic uncertainty relation excludes a mechanical underpinning: “The
very fact that uncertainty relations exist in thermodynamics between . . . energy and
inverse temperature, makes it all but impossible that a probabilistic interpretation
of thermodynamics would ever be superseded by [a] deterministic one, rooted in the
dynamics of large assemblies of molecules”.
We now turn to the derivation of (33). Lavenda provides several, but all based on
different assumptions. We shall discuss two of his derivations of (33) with equality
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sign, and one of the corresponding inequality. A major role throughout the approach
is played by the identification of the value of a maximum likelihood estimator and
the expected value of a parameter in the posterior probability distribution. He
is able to trace the assumption back to Gauss’s attempts to justify the method
of least squares, and therefore baptizes it “Gauss’ principle”. However, he does
not give a convincing motivation for this assumption. Since in principle estimators
and expected values are very different quantities, we reject this assumption, and
have therefore tried to circumvent it as much as possible in our reconstruction of
Lavenda’s work.
To obtain the uncertainty relation with equality sign, Lavenda9 starts from
the assumption that the system consists of a large number n of non-interacting
identical subsystems, so that its total energy can be written as Utot =
∑n
i=1 Ui.
Each subsystem has a canonical distribution. Thus,
p(U1, . . . , Un|β) =
∏n
i=1 ω(Ui)
Zn(β)
e−βUtot (34)
and our goal is to consider the posterior distribution
p(β|U1, . . . , Un) = p(U1, . . . , Un|β)ρ(β)Z(U) . (35)
We have already noted that the total energy Utot is a sufficient estimator for β in
the canonical distribution. For the Bayesian approach the cash value of this is that
the posterior depend on Utot alone:
p(β|U1, . . . , Un) = p(β|Utot). (36)
In order to obtain the approximate shape of this distribution for large n, one can
make a second-order Taylor expansion of log p(U1, . . . , Un|β) as a function of β
around its maximum value:
p(U1, . . . , Un|β) ≃ p(βˆ1(Utot)) exp
(
−1
2
(β − βˆ1(Utot))2J(Utot)
)
(37)
where βˆ1(Utot) is the maximum likelihood estimate, and
J(Utot) = −
(
∂2 log p(Utot|β)
(∂β)2
)
β=βˆ1(Utot)
. (38)
It is easy to show that
J(Utot) = −
(
∂2 logZ(β)
(∂β)2
)
β=nβˆ1(Utot)
= IF (βˆ1(Utot)). (39)
Thus, this is just another version of the Fisher information.
For large n one expects that J ∝ n, so that (37) is appreciably different from
zero only in a small region around βˆ1(Utot). Inserting in (30), and assuming that
ρ(β) behaves reasonably smoothly and does not vanish in this region, one obtains
p(β|Utot) ≃
√
J(Utot)
2π
exp
(
−1
2
(β − βˆ1)2J(Utot)
)
(40)
so that the prior drops out of the posterior.
The standard deviation of β in the Gaussian posterior distribution (40) is obvi-
ously
∆Uβ =
1√
J(U)
. (41)
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Also, it is clear from (38) that
J(Utot) = n
(
∆βˆ1(Utot)U
)2
= (∆Utot)
2. (42)
Combination of these leads to the uncertainty relation (33) with equality sign, for
the specific choice β = βˆ1(U).
Lavenda also offers an argument to determine the form of the prior distribution
from the asymptotic expression and the demand that the expectation value of β
in the posterior distribution (30) should coincide with the maximum likelihood
estimator for this parameter. Interestingly, this leads to the Jeffreys prior. His
argument seems to be erroneous,28 but since the prior drops out anyway, this has
no effect on the remainder of his analysis.
Lavenda also provides another derivation for the uncertainty relation with equal-
ity sign.8,10 Here, no assumption about the number of subsystems and no Gaussian
approximation are needed. Instead, Gauss’ principle is invoked in order to equate
the expectation value of β in the posterior distribution with the parameter in the
canonical distribution. The entropy S(〈U〉) is identified with − lnZ(〈U〉), the sec-
ond derivative of which equals
∂2S
∂〈U〉2 = −
(
∆〈U〉β
)2
. (43)
Here 〈U〉 denotes the expectation value of the energy in the canonical distribution.
On the other hand, by equating 〈β〉〈U〉 with β,
∂2S
∂〈U〉2 =
∂〈β〉〈U〉
∂〈U〉 =
(
∂〈U〉
∂β
)−1
= − (∆βU)−2 , (44)
and the desired result follows. Again the uncertainty relation is derived for a specific
value for one of the parameters only, but now for U = 〈U〉 instead of β = βˆ1.
Let us now consider relation (33) with inequality sign. Lavenda notes that such
an inquality is connected with the Crame´r-Rao inequality, but claims that its phys-
ical content lies in the existence of irreversible processes. His idea is to make use of
the Second Law, ∆S1+∆S2 ≥ 0, for the entropy increase during a process in an iso-
lated compound system, and transform this inequality into the desired uncertainty
relation (i.e. (33) with inequality sign) by making use of standard thermodynamic
relations and certain identifications of thermodynamic quantities with statistical
ones.
However, as we shall show, the derivations provided by Lavenda are in error:
the validity of the uncertainty relation with equality sign is presupposed in the
statement of the relation with inequality sign. Thus, his claim that the strict
inequality is instantiated by irreversible processes is mistaken.
In his book29 Lavenda considers two subsystems initially at temperatures T1
and T2 and assumes they are placed in thermal contact so that they are allowed to
exchange energy in the form of heat, but not any work. Then, if an infinitesimal
amount of energy δU is exchanged the total entropy will change by:
δS1 + δS2 =
(
1
T1
− 1
T2
)
δU ≥ 0. (45)
Now suppose that both systems are ideal gases, and that as a result of the energy
exchange, system 1 changes its temperature from T1 to T1 + δT . Then its entropy
change will be
δS1 = cV ln
T1 + δT
T1
≈ cV δT
T1
= −cV T1δβ (46)
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Hence
δS1 + δS2 = −cV T1δβ − δU
T2
=
(
−cV T1T2 δβ
δU
− 1
)
δU
T2
(47)
Now, by some inscrutable reasoning, Lavenda argues for the validity of the following
relations (at least valid up to second order)
IF = −δU
δβ
= ∆U2 = (∆β)−2 = cV T1T2 (48)
where IF is the Fisher information. Using these equations one finds
δS1 + δS2 =
(
IF∆β
2 − 1) δU
T2
≥ 0 (49)
from which the desired inequality follows
∆U∆β ≥ 1 (50)
since δU > 0. Thus, according to Lavenda, the uncertainty relation actually stems
from the Second Law of thermodynamics.
This argument is obviously erroneous. A first objection is that the validity of
the left-hand part (45) is already confined to the case of reversible proceses only,
so that the total entropy must remain constant. What is worse, however, is that
the relations (48) already by themselves imply the stronger relation ∆U∆β = 1,
regardless of whether we consider a reversible or irreversible process.
In conclusion, there is no indication that an uncertainty relation with inequality
sign can be derived in the Bayesian approach, let alone be explained in terms
of irreversible processes. Further, we have seen that only one of the derivations
Lavenda presents for the relation with equality sign, can stand the test of critical
analysis. This leads to the result that for a system consisting of a large number of
subsystems, and with a Gaussian approximation for the posterior distribution, the
relation
∆βˆ1(U)U∆Uβ = 1 (51)
holds asymptotically.
One cannot help but note the close mathematical connection between this deriva-
tion and that of Mandelbrot, in spite of their widely different statistical philosophy.
We have seen that in the large sample approximation, the Bayesian prior drops out
of equation (40) and the posterior becomes simply proportional to the likelihood
function LU (β) = pβ(U). On account of the symmetry between β and βˆ in this
Gaussian, it becomes formally immaterial whether we regard this expression as a
distribution over β (as favoured by Lavenda) or over the estimator βˆ1, as done
by Mandelbrot. The standard deviations will in both cases be given by 1/
√
IF .
Thus, Lavenda’s result can be seen as a consequence of Mandelbrot’s inequality
(and the fact that the Maximum Likelihood estimator asymptotically saturates the
Crame´r-Rao bound).
3.4 The approach by fiducial probability: Lindhard
A different approach to thermodynamical uncertainty relations was given by Lindhard11.
Like Rosenfeld, Lindhard restricts his discussion to a system with fixed volume in
contact with a heat bath. Like Mandelbrot and Lavenda, he uses Gibbsian ensem-
bles to determine the probability distributions, instead of the Einstein postulate.
But unlike previous authors, Lindhard considers both the canonical and micro-
canonical ensembles as well as intermediate cases, describing a small system in
thermal contact with a heat bath of varying size.
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The relation he derives is
(∆U)2 + C2(∆T )2 = kT 2C. (52)
Here, ∆T and ∆U are standard deviations of temperature and energy of the sys-
tem, and C = ∂U/∂T is its heat capacity. This relation has a somewhat different
appearance from the uncertainty relations we have encountered so far, but it is still
an uncertainty relation in the sense that it expresses that one standard deviation
can only become small at the expense of the other’s increase.
The relation is intended to cover as extreme cases both the canonical ensemble,
where, according to Lindhard, ∆T = 0 and
(∆U)2 = kT 2C, (53)
and the microcanonical ensemble, for which ∆U = 0 and
(∆T )2 = kT 2/C. (54)
Thus, we here have a candidate relation which holds for a class of ensembles, and
can be seen as expressing a complementarity, not only between temperature and
energy, but also between the canonical and microcanonical description, in the same
way as the (improper) eigenstates of position and momentum appear as extreme
cases in the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations.
To obtain his result Lindhard starts from the canonical distribution (19) de-
scribing a system in contact with an infinitely large heat bath at fixed temperature
T . The standard deviation of its energy can be expressed as
(∆U)2 = kT 2
∂〈U〉
∂T
= kT 2〈C〉. (55)
This yields (53). Next, Lindhard “inverts” the canonical distribution, to obtain
pU (β) =
∂
∂β
∫ U
0
pβ(U
′)dU ′, (56)
and interprets this as the probability of the unknown temperature of the heat bath.
He argues that, due to its infinite size, the heat bath can itself be regarded as an
isolated system, and can thus be described by means of a microcanonical distribu-
tion. Hence the inverted distribution (56) can be interpreted as a microcanonical
probability distribution for temperature. The standard deviation of this distribu-
tion should then yield (54). Lindhard does not prove this, but notes that it is
approximately true when the heat bath is an ideal gas.
To get to intermediate distributions, Lindhard observes that, just like a canon-
ically distributed system is in contact with a heat bath of infinite heat capacity, an
isolated system can be construed as being in contact with a heat bath of zero heat
capacity. Thus one obtains intermediate cases by considering a heat bath having a
capacity ξC, with C the capacity of the system itself and 0 < ξ < ∞. Lindhard
now assumes that the probability distribution for the energy of such a system takes
the shape of a Gaussian distribution with width (∆U)2 = σ2c ξ/(1 + ξ), where σ
2
c is
the standard deviation in the energy for a canonical distribution (53). Combining
this result with (54) which now reads
(∆T )2 =
kT 2
(1 + ξ)C
(57)
and eliminating ξ we finally obtain the result (52). Lindhard also claims, without
proof, that for more general probability distributions this result holds too, with the
equality replaced by a greater or equal sign.
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There are, obviously, a number of objections to Lindhard’s approach. On first
sight, his inversion procedure seems obscure. It is interesting to note, however,
that the formula (56) for a probability distribution over an unknown parameter in
the light of an observed value U is well-known in another approach to statistical
inference proposed by Fisher and usually called fiducial probability. This approach
provides a rival statistical procedure, alternative to both estimation theory and
Bayesian statistics, and gives Lindhard’s inversion technique a theoretical back-
ground. Fisher restricted this fiducial argument to the cases where a sufficient
estimator for the parameter exists and where its distribution is monotonous as a
function of the parameter. This approach, however, is controversial and plagued by
paradoxes.30 Mandelbrot31 captures general opinion in the remark that the fiducial
argument is “often regarded as to be carefully avoided”.
Secondly, there are many gaps in Lindhard’s argument. It is not clear that
the inverted distribution will indeed have the standard deviation (54) for systems
other than an ideal gas. Also, his description of the intermediate cases by means of
Gaussian approximations seems to be too simplified to be persuasive.
Remarkable is finally that Lindhard’s argument involves a shift in the system
under consideration. The distribution (56) pertains, in first instance, to the heat
bath. It is used, however, to describe the small system. In order to make this shift
Lindhard simply assumes that the temperature fluctuations of the total system
equal those of its subsystems. This is in marked contrast with all other authors on
the subject. In fact, there are also experimental indications against the validity of
this assumption.32
4 Statistical distance
We now describe a fourth approach to statistical inference, which we favour. This
is the likelihood approach, which was also developed by Fisher, and later advocated
by Barnard, Hacking and Edwards. We shall show how this leads to a natural
measure of inaccuracy in a parameter and use this for the formulation of uncertainty
relations, both quantum mechanical and for temperature-energy in the canonical
distribution.
The idea is here, first of all, that the likelihood function itself conveys all in-
formation provided by the data about the unknown parameter. In this respect
the approach agrees with Bayesianism. But now the value of the logarithm of the
likelihood function is interpreted as the relative support that the data bestow on
parameter values. Thus, the parameter value for which the likelihood is maximal is
regarded as the best supported one. This is in close agreement with the use of ML
estimators in estimation theory. The basic difference with estimation theory is that
the quality of the inference is judged not by the standard deviation of the estimator
but by the form of the likelihood function.
Let us write
Sx(θ) := ln pθ(x) (58)
for the support function and assume for the moment that this is a smooth function
of θ. A natural way to quantify its width is then by the curvature at its maximum.
Hence,
− d
2
dθ2
log pθ(x)
∣∣∣∣
θ=θmax
(59)
gives a measure of the uncertainty in the values of θ on the basis of observed data
x.
Now take a slightly more abstract point of view and consider the inferences to
be expected if the data x are drawn from a probability distribution pθ0 . Then, the
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expected support becomes
Sθ0(θ) = −
∫
pθ0(x) log pθ(x)dx (60)
with a maximum at θ = θ0. The expected width is then
−
∫
pθ0(x)
d2
dθ2
log pθ(x)
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
dx (61)
which is just another form of the Fisher information (15). We thus see that in the
likelihood approach this expression serves not merely as a theoretical bound for
the efficiency of all estimators, but has itself a definite statistical interpretation.
It represents the width of the expected support function, i.e. how easily θ0 can be
distinguished from slightly different parameter values. In this sense it is really a
measure of how much information one may expect to obtain about the parameter
from an observation.
It has been noted by many authors (Rao, Jeffreys) that the Fisher information
actually defines a metric on the set of all parameter values θ. That is
δd =
1
2
√
I(θ) δθ (62)
provides an distance element for the family {pθ} which is invariant under parameter
transformations. In fact by allowing multidimensional, or even infinite-dimensional
parameters, one can extend this metric over all probability distributions on a given
outcome set. We refer to other works for details.33,34 The distance between proba-
bility distributions is given by
d(pθ0 , pθ1) = arccos
∫ √
pθ0(x)pθ1(x) dx. (63)
(In the following, we shall write d(θ0, θ1) for short.) This then provides a measure
of distinguishability of two probability distributions. It is not only invariant under
reparametrization, but even completely independent of the original family with
which we started. Thus it remains useful also when this family is not smooth. This
use of the Fisher information in the likelihood approach as a metric expressing the
distinguishability of distributions should not be confused with Jeffreys’ proposal to
use it as a prior probability distribution.
It is possible to give a lower bound for the right-hand side in terms of the
endpoints pθ0 and pθ1 only (see the Appendix), to wit:
d(pθ0 , pθ1) ≥ arccos


(
1 +
a2
(2∆θˆ)2
)−1/2 , (64)
where a = (1/2) |〈θˆ〉θ0−〈θˆ〉θ1 |, and ∆θˆ = max(∆θ0 θˆ,∆θ1 θˆ). This relation illustrates
the fact that when the distance between two probability distributions is small,
the inefficiency of any estimator is necessarily large. We can put this in a more
transparent form by defining an inaccuracy in θ, as the smallest parameter difference
needed to produce a statistical distance greater than α, where α is some convenient
number between 0 and π/2. Thus, we define δαθ as the smallest positive solution
of
d(θ, θ + δαθ) = α. (65)
Then the inequality
δαθ
2 ≤ (cos−2 α− 1)∆θˆ2 (66)
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shows that δαθ indeed provides a lower bound to estimation efficiency.
Of course, if the original family is regular (i.e. represented by a smooth curve),
it is well approximated locally by a geodesic, and the improvement obtained over
the Crame´r-Rao inequality is spurious. By taking δθ = θ1 − θ0 infinitesimal one
easily shows from (62) that the inequality (66) reduces to the Crame´r-Rao inequal-
ity. However, if the family is singular, the Crame´r-Rao inequality does not apply,
whereas the inequality (66) still yields a lower bound to the estimation efficiency.
An advantage of this approach is that exactly the same approach can and indeed
already has been taken to the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations.34,35 In-
deed, consider a set of quantum states |ψx〉 = e−ixP |ψ〉 which are mutually shifted
in space by a parameter x, and suppose we want to make an inference about this
parameter. If we perform a measurement of some obervable A with eigenstates |a〉,
say, the problem becomes the comparison of probability distributions |〈ψx|a〉|2 for
the unknown parameter x. Just as in the classical case, we can define a statistical
distance between two states:
dA(ψ1, ψ2) = arccos
∑
a
|〈ψ1|a〉〈a|ψ2〉| (67)
The only important distinction with the classical case is that in quantum theory
this statistical distance depends on the choice of the observable A. It is natural then
to introduce the absolute statistical distance as the supremum over all observables:
dabs(ψ1, ψ2) = sup
A
dA(ψ1, ψ2) = arccos |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|. (68)
If we define an inaccuracy δαx in the location parameter x just as before, i.e. as
the smallest value of δx that solves
dabs(ψx, ψx+δx) = α (69)
one obtains the relations
δαx∆P ≥ h¯α (70)
where ∆P is the standard deviation in the momentum observable of the quantum
system. Thus, the inacuracy in the location of the state in space is related to the
standard deviation in its momentum.
Similarly, suppose that one wants to estimate the age of a quantum system, i.e.
to estimate the parameter t in its evolution |ψt〉 = EiHt/h¯|ψ〉, where H denotes the
Hamiltonian. Then one has
δαt∆H ≥ h¯α. (71)
For an unstable system, such as a decaying atom, this gives the well-known relation
between half-life and line width.
Taking δx (or δt) infinitesimal, these relations reduce to the Crame´r-Rao version:
∆xQˆ∆xP ≥ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣d〈Qˆ〉dx
∣∣∣∣∣ (72)
∆tTˆ∆tH ≥ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣d〈Tˆ 〉dt
∣∣∣∣∣ (73)
for any observable Qˆ (or Tˆ ) which would be useful for estimating the location (or
age) of the system. Relation (72) was given by Le´vy-Leblond36. When applied to
an ‘unbiased’ observable, i.e. when
〈Qˆ〉 = 〈ψx|Qˆ|ψx〉 = x (74)
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we obtain the standard Heisenberg form of the uncertainty relation, although for
a more general class of operators than position Q alone. The last-mentioned ver-
sion of the uncertainty relation (73) for energy and time was already derived by
Mandelstam and Tamm37
Let us now apply the concept of statistical distance and the resulting generalized
uncertainty relations to statistical mechanics. The distance between two canonical
distributions is
d(pβ1 , pβ2) = arccos
[
Z(β1+β22 )√
Z(β1)Z(β2)
]
. (75)
This relation is interesting in its own right. It is a well-known, and oft-repeated
fact that the canonical partition function Z(β) is log-convex. This is equivalent
to the the statement that the above factor between brackets is always less than or
equal to one. The fact that its arccosine forms a distance function does not seem
to be so well known. In this case we obtain
δβ∆U ≥ α (76)
with
∆U =
1
δβ
∫ β+δβ
β
∆βUdβ (77)
in analogy with (70) and (71). Thus the symmetry in these two types of uncertainty
relations is recovered. The only difference with the quantum mechanical relations is
that for the canonical family ∆U depends on β, whereas for a free quantum system
∆P and ∆H do not depend on x or t, which explains why an average as in (77) is
unnecessary.
5 Interpolation between canonical and microcanon-
ical ensembles; the case study by Prosper
Up till now we have met several unsuccessful arguments aiming to extend the un-
certainty relation for energy and temperature from the canonical ensemble to the
microcanonical ensemble. This raises the question whether there actually is a com-
plementarity between these two ensembles, as envisaged by Bohr or Landau and
Lifschitz. It is therefore of interest to analyze thermal fluctuations in intermediate
situations.
A case study of such thermal fluctuations in a classical ideal gas was given by
Prosper38. Consider a system in d spatial dimensions, consisting of N particles in
contact with a another system of M particles acting as a finite size heat bath. It is
assumed that both are ideal gases.
We assume that the total system, consisting of N +M particles, is described by
a microcanonical distribution with fixed energy ǫ. From this one can calculate the
probability that the system has an energy U :
pǫ(U) =
1
B(n,m)
(
U
ǫ
)n−1(
1− U
ǫ
)m−1
1
ǫ
, 0 ≤ U ≤ ǫ (78)
where n = d2N ; m =
d
2M ; N,M ≥ 1 and
B(n,m) =
Γ(n)Γ(m)
Γ(n+m)
. (79)
In the limit m→∞, mǫ = β∞ this distribution tends to the canonical one, with the
temperature parameter β∞. One the other hand, when the size of the heat bath is
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negligible compared to the system, i.e. when m becomes very small compared to n,
the distribution becomes sharply peaked just below the value U = ǫ, resembling the
microcanonical one. (Note, however, that the representation (78) ceases to be valid
for m = 0.) Thus, for varying m we have a family of distributions that interpolate
between the canonical and microcanonical ensembles.
The standard deviation of the energy is
(∆U)2 =
nmǫ2
(n+m+ 1)(n+m)2
, (80)
and the question is again what to say about the temperature of the system. Prosper
uses a Bayesian approach to quantify its uncertainty. However, as we have seen in
the work of Lavenda, this uncertainty in temperature will not lead to an uncer-
tainty relation for a finite system. Instead, we shall try Mandelbrot’s approach and
compare this to the statistical distance approach.
We first assign a temperature-like parameter to the system by reparameterizing
ǫ. The choice of such a parameter is only straightforward in the limiting case m→
∞. But for finite m the choice is more or less arbitrary. Let us put β := n〈U〉 = n+mǫ .
Thus this parameter coincides with the canonical temperature β∞ as m→∞.
Suppose we wish to estimate β from a measurement of U . The Fisher information
in the parameter β is:
IF (β) =


∞ m = 1/2, 3/2, 2
n2
β2 m = 1
n(m+n−1)
(m−2)β2 m > 2
(81)
Using (80) we obtain the Crame´r-Rao inequality for the parameter β:
(∆U)2(∆βˆ)2 ≥ m(m− 2)
(n+m)2 − 1 (m > 2). (82)
showing the limited efficiency of all unbiased estimators for β. This lower bound is
independent of β and increasing inm. Form→∞, it reduces to the canonical value
1, already obtained in (21). Thus for the ideal gas we see indeed a gradual transition
from the canonical case (relation (21)) for m → ∞ to the microcanonical case
(relation (29)), where the uncertainty product vanishes. Somewhat disappointing
is, however, that we cannot carry out a limit m → 0. Already for m = 2, the
Fisher information is infinite. This is, however, no indication that the parameter β
becomes perfectly estimable for small m. Rather, for m ≤ 2 the distributions are
singular and the Crame´r-Rao inequality no longer holds. (Cf. footnote 17.)
Thus the inequality (82) expresses the gradual transition between canonical and
microcanonical distribution, but not perfectly.
Here, the method of statistical distance offers a more detailed analysis of the
situation. The statistical distance for some values of n and m are as follows:
d(β0, β1) = arccos Imn(b) with b =
√
β0
β1
(β0 ≤ β1) (83)
and I11(b) = b (84)
I21(b) =
1 + b2
2b
+
(b2 − 1)2
4b2
log
1− b
1 + b
(85)
I31(b) =
b
2
(3− b2) (86)
I41(b) =
1
32b4
(
−6b+ 22b3 + 22b5 − 6b7 − 3(b2 − 1)4 log 1− b
1 + b
)
(87)
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Figure 1: Statistical distance as a function of the relative temperature difference
(δβ)/β0 for n = 1 and various values of m. For m > 2 this distance increases
linearly for small values of δβ; for m ≤ 2 the distance element is singular and grows
more rapidly.
I51(b) =
b
6
(10− 5b2 + b4). (88)
I1n = b
n (89)
Figure 1 shows for the simplest case of n = 1 how these distances behave as a
function of δβ = β1 − β0. It is seen that for small δβ the statistical distance grows
linearly with δβ when m > 2, but much faster when m ≤ 2, due to the singularity
of the associated distributions (78). Thus, with the same choice for the value of α,
the inacurracy δαβ is much smaller for m ≤ 2 than for m > 2. However this does
not mean that there is no lower bound. For example, for n = m = 1 one finds
δαβ∆βU ≥ (cos−2 α− 1)/
√
3. (90)
For larger systems (n > 1), the expression for the statistical distance becomes
generally more complicated. However, the same trend is observed: if the heat bath
is small (m ≤ 2), the statistical distance d(β, β + δβ) increases more rapidly than
δβ but it behaves regularly (i.e. d(β, β + δβ) ∝ δβ) for m > 2. However there is a
positive lower bound to the uncertainty product in all cases, viz.
δαβ∆βU ≥
√
nm
n+m+ 1
(
I invmn(cosα)
−2 − 1) . (91)
If we choose α≪ 1, the right-hand side is here of order α form > 2 and α2 form = 1.
We recover, therefore, the same conclusion as before: in a gradual transition from
a canonical to a microcanonical distribution the uncertainty product is bounded by
a constant gradually approaching zero. We thus see that the uncertainty relations
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obtained in this approach remain valid also for singular families. However, the
right-hand side is then much lower than in the regular case.
Of course these conclusions are obtained only for the case study of the ideal gas.
Yet it remains remarkable that, in the approach using the statistical distance, one
obtains non-trivial uncertainty relations for regular as well as singular families. A
serious challenge would then be to apply this to systems capable of phase transitions.
This, however, falls outside the scope of this paper.
6 Discussion
We have reviewed several approaches to the formulation of thermodynamic uncer-
tainty relations in the existing literature. Only two have a reasonably general deriva-
tion, free from undesirable simplifying assumptions. The formulation of Schlo¨gl per-
tains to a version of statistical thermodynamics founded on the Einstein postulate.
The second formulation is by Mandelbrot. His result is valid for canonical ensem-
bles both in his own axiomatic version of statistical thermodynamics as well as in
statistical mechanics. In Schlo¨gl’s treatment, the system has a randomly fluctuating
temperature, in Mandelbrot’s case the temperature is identified with a parameter in
its probability distribution. Its uncertainty is identified with estimation efficiency
and his uncertainty relation is valid for regular families, i.e. barring phase transi-
tions. We have also proposed an extension of Mandelbrot’s approach by means of
the theory of likelihood inference. Here the uncertainty in the temperature parame-
ter is quantified by means of statistical distance. The uncertainty relation obtained
in this way is valid also for non-regular families.
Both Mandelbrot’s result and the generalization we proposed are in close analogy
with formulations of uncertainty relations in quantum mechanics. This provides a
good reason to take them just as serious as the quantum mechanical relations.
Still, there are deep differences between statistical mechanics and quantum theory
in particular in their interpretations of probability. When in quantum mechanics
a system is described probabilistically, this is usually said to represent the state
of the system completely; in contrast, the probability distributions in statistical
mechanics are regarded as ‘only’ convenient tools. In this case the mechanical phase
space provides the underlying variables which in quantum mechanics are regarded as
hidden or even non-existent. The probabilistic description gives only a small part of
the information concerning the system that could in principle be obtained. But — it
also gives something more. As we have seen, complete knowledge of the microstate
would not suffice to infer the temperature of the system. What we have added by
giving a probabilistic description is the notion of the ensemble, of which the system
of interest is only a member. That is, we have added something which goes beyond
the particular system we are studying. This points to a common feature between the
quantum case and the statistical mechanical case. Once we have accepted that our
system is described by some probability distribution out of a certain parameterized
class, the problem of statistical inference of the parameter occurs in exactly the
same way, and the uncertainty in this parameter can be quantified with the same
methods.
In all the approaches mentioned, there is no uncertainty relation for energy and
temperature for an energetically isolated system. Therefore, the results do not jus-
tify a claim for complementarity between energetic isolation and thermal contact,
as envisaged by Bohr and Heisenberg. Indeed, we conclude that no such comple-
mentarity exists. Mandelbrot’s attempt to give his relation a more general validity
by regarding the isolated system, counterfactually, as a case which could have been
described by a canonical ensemble is not convincing. We also come to the conclusion
that there doesn’t exist a complementarity between the microcanonical and canon-
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ical ensembles. In particular, it is not true (as Lindhard claims) that the extremes
of any valid uncertainty relation are covered by these ensembles respectively. In
fact, the study of intermediate cases reveals that the product of the uncertainties in
energy and temperature gradually changes from zero (microcanonical case) to one
(canonical case).
In this respect there are strong disanalogies between the thermodynamic and
the quantum mechanical uncertainty relations. It is sometimes argued3,9 that
the mathematical basis of the uncertainty relationship in quantum mechanics (the
Fourier transform between position and momentum eigenstates) is so analogous to
the Laplace transform relationship between the canonical and microcanonical en-
sembles, that an analogous relationship should be expected. However, this analogy
is misleading. The canonical distribution is a convex mixture of microcanonical
ones, but not vice versa. The grand-canonical distribution, where the number of
particles is also variable, is in turn a mixture of canonical ones, etc. Thus, these
ensembles of statistical mechanics are ordered in a hierarchical scale of increasing
randomness. This is quite different from the symmetry in the Fourier relationship
between the position and momentum eigenstates of quantum mechanics.
We finally return to what seems the philosophically most surprising aspect of
our review. Do thermodynamical uncertainty relations entail an obstacle to a mi-
croscopic underpinning of thermodynamics, in the same way as their quantum me-
chanical counterparts forbid the existence of hidden variables? We have seen that
all of the protagonists in our discussion (except Lindhard) claimed this to be true.
If so, it would provide an example in classical physics of a situation which is usually
seen as exclusive to the quantum world and undreamt of in classical physics.
The first point to make in this connection is that already in quantum mechan-
ics the uncertainty relations (in the standard form) do not forbid hidden-variables
reconstructions. A much more formidable obstacle is the theorem of Kochen and
Specker. Hence, one cannot argue from a supposed analogy here, since the analogy
fails already in quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen viewpoint that the uncer-
tainty relations prevent a hidden variables reconstruction of quantum mechanics
is due to the additional assumption that the physical description by quantum me-
chanics is already complete.
This is not to say however, that a mechanical underpinning or ‘reduction’ of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is straightforward. Indeed, the uncer-
tainty relations studied here may shed new light on the often heard statement that
the relation between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics is the archetypal
example of a successful theory reduction. Only some thermodynamic functions can
be immediately identified as functions on phase space. It is only for these quantities
that a complete description of the microstate of the system would be sufficient to
determine them completely. But for quantities defined statistically, i.e. as param-
eters or functionals on a probability distribution, like temperature, entropy and
chemical potential, the complete specification of the microstate will never suffice.
That is what forms the basis for the uncertainty relations we have studied: no phase
function can exactly mimick such parameters (for a range of their values). In this
particular sense, these relations do express the impossibility of a ‘hidden-variables’
style extension of statistical thermodynamics. Observe that no non-commutativity
is needed for this conclusion.
Of course this view depends on the definition of temperature (and chemical
potential etc.) as a parameter in a probability distribution. Another option that
we have encountered is to consider one of the estimator functions as a definition
of temperature, rather than as a smart guess (and therefore of course drop the
qualification ‘estimator’). Then temperature becomes a function on phase space,
irrespective of which probability distribution we choose to describe our system. No
uncertainty relation for such a temperature function has been established except for
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the canonical ensembles. But in this case we are still left with the question which
function to choose, because many can be defined which differ radically for finite
systems. The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics therefore still
seems to be an open problem.
7 Appendix
Here we prove the following inequality: for any one-parameter family of probability
distributions pθ and any unbiased estimator θˆ for θ we have
∫ √
pθ1(x)pθ0(x)dx ≤
(
1 +
(
θ1 − θ0
2∆
)2)−1/2
, (92)
where ∆ := max(∆θ1 θˆ,∆θ2 θˆ). For n repeated independent observations, this result
obviously generalizes to
(∫ √
pθ1(x)pθ0(x)dx
)n
≤
(
1 +
(
θ1 − θ0
2∆n
)2)−1/2
(93)
with ∆n := max(∆θ1 θˆn,∆θ2 θˆn).
The idea behind the proof is to use the Crame´r-Rao inequality, not for the curve
formed by the family pθ but for a geodesic between the points pθ1 and pθ2 . The
geodesic between θ1 and θ0 is the family of distributions of the form
pα = (α
√
p0 + β
√
p1)
2
(94)
where α varies between 0 and 1, and β obeys
α2 + β2 + 2αβc = 1 (95)
c =
∫ √
p0p1dx. (96)
Although θˆ need not be a good estimator for this geodesic family, the CR inequality
is nevertheless still valid: √
IF (α) ≥
∣∣∣d〈θˆ〉αdα ∣∣∣
∆αθˆ
(97)
and we can integrate this along the geodesic. This yields
d(θ0, θ1) = arccos
∫ √
pθ1(x)pθ0(x)dx =
∫
1
2
√
IF (α)dα ≥
∫ 1
0
|d〈θˆ〉dα |
2∆αθˆ
dα. (98)
Since our purpose is to find a lower bound for the right hand side, we may assume,
without loss of generality, that 〈θˆ〉α is monotonous in α. Then there exists an
invertible function y(α) = 〈θˆ〉α. Further, since the integrals are invariant under a
linear transformation θˆ → cθˆ + d we can arrange that 〈θˆ〉0 = −a, 〈θˆ〉1 = a. Thus:
∫ 1
0
|d〈θˆ〉dα |
2∆αθˆ
dα ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
d〈θˆ〉
2∆θˆ
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a
−a
dy
2
√
〈θˆ2〉α(y) − y2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (99)
The strategy is now to find an upper bound for 〈θˆ2〉α in terms of 〈θˆ2〉0, 〈θˆ2〉1
and a. Suppose for the moment that such an upper bound exists, so that, say,
〈θˆ2〉α ≤ A2. (100)
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Then we easily obtain∫ a
−a
dy
2
√
〈θˆ〉α − y2
≥
∫ a
−a
dy
2
√
A2 − y2
= arcsin
a
A
. (101)
Combining this with (98) we find:
d(pθ1 , pθ2) ≥ arcsin
a
A
(102)
or ∫ √
pθ0(x)pθ1(x)dx ≤
√
1−
( a
A
)2
. (103)
It remains to show that an upper bound (100) indeed exists.
Now the expectation 〈θˆ2〉α along the geodesic can be written as a convex sum:
〈θˆ2〉 = α2〈θˆ2〉0 + β2〈θˆ2〉1 + 2αβc〈θˆ2〉2 (104)
where 〈.〉2 denotes averaging with respect to the auxiliary probability density
p2(x) =
1
c
√
p0(x)p1(x) (105)
Its maximum value depends on which of the three expectations 〈θˆ2〉i is the largest.
We distinguish two cases: (i) 〈θˆ2〉0 or 〈θˆ2〉1 is the largest; or (ii) 〈θˆ2〉2 is the largest
of the three.
In case (i) the convex sum reaches its maximum when α is 1 or 0. Clearly the
argument will be similar in both cases, so let us only consider α = 1. This gives:
〈θˆ2〉α ≤ 〈θˆ2〉1 = ∆2 + a2 (106)
This is the value of A2 in case (1). Inserting in (103) leads to the result of theorem.
In case (ii) the convex sum (104) is maximal when α2 = β2 = 12(1+c) . We thus
find the upper bound
〈θˆ2〉α ≤ 〈θˆ
2〉0 + 〈θˆ2〉1
1 + c
+
c
1 + c
〈θˆ2〉2 (107)
and we have to find an upper bound for 〈θˆ2〉2. Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
and the general inequality (A+ x)(B + x) ≤ ((A+B)/2 + x)2 in turn gives:
〈(θˆ − r)(θˆ + r)〉2 ≤ 1
c
√
〈(θˆ + r)2〉0〈(θˆ − r)2〉1
=
1
c
√
(∆20 + (a− r)2)(∆21 + (a− r)2)
≤ 1
c
(D2 + (a− r)2) (108)
where ∆i := ∆iθˆ, and
D2 := (∆20 +∆
2
1)/2. (109)
This inequality (108) is valid for all r; one may choose r so as to optimize the
strength of the bound. This is the case when r = a/(1 + c) and we obtain:
〈θˆ2〉2 ≤ D
2
c
+
a2
1 + c
(110)
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which is our upper bound for 〈θˆ2〉2. Combining this with (107) gives the desired
upper bound for case (ii):
〈θˆ2〉α ≤ D2 2
1 + c
+ a2
1 + 2c
1 + c
. (111)
Inserting this in (103) yields, after a bit of algebra,
∫ √
pθ0(x)pθ1(x)dx ≤
(
1 +
a2
D2
)−1/2
(112)
which, in view of (109), is even slightly stronger than the announced theorem.
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